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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAII STr\TE BUILDING 
BOARD, et al, Plaintiffs~ 
vs. 
GEORGE R. ROMNEY and lVI. 
'VALLACE ROMNEY, dba G. 
l\IAURICE ROMNEY COMPA-
NY, a partnership, and 1-\.MERI-
CAN CASUALTY COMPANY, 
of Reading Pennsylvania, a corpora-
tion, 




CO~IPANY, a corporation, 




PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Third Party Defendant and Respondent, Indus-
trial Indemnity Company, a corporation, respectfully 
moves the court for a rehearing in the above entitled 
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case. The rehearing should be granted for the following 
reason: 
1. The court inadvertently overlooked and did not 
consider or discuss a major point on this appeal and a 
major ground for the decision of the court below. 
SUPPORTING BRIEF 
POINT I 
THE PRINCIPAL ON THE BOND IN 
THIS CASE, ONE J. G. WEDDING, SOLD 
THE PLUMBING BUSINESS TO SYLVIA 
RHODE, \VHO THEN INCORPORATED THE 
BUSINESS AS WALSH PLUMBING COM-
PANY, AND THEREAFTER ISSUED 
CHECKS FOR LABOR AND MATERIAL 
CLAIMS WHICH WERE NOT HONORED BY 
TRACY COLLINS BANK. 
The court in this case, by virtue of the decision 
herein, is compelling Respondent, Industrial Indemnity 
Company, to pay the obligation of a different principal 
from the one it bonded in accordance with the bond and 
the contract now before the court. 
Regardless of certain recitals on the face of the 
bond (pretrial Exhibit No. 1) and in Paragraph 1 of 
the subcontract (Exhibit D. 16) referred to by the 
court in the seventh paragraph of its dc;cision herein, 
the facts of this case are that at the time of the sub-
4 
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contract and bond in issue in this case, the subcontractor 
-and the principal on the bond-was an individual, 
.J. G. Wedding, and Appellant, prime contractor, 
Romney, was aware of this fact. The subcontract itself 
(Exhibit D. 16) is signed "'Valsh Plumbing Company 
by J. G. 'Vedding, Owner". 
The bond, as the pretrial findings and the judg-
ment in this case clearly show, was written for J. G. 
"'" edding as principal, Paragraph 5 of the pretrial 
order (R. 226) and Paragraph 3 of the judgment (R. 
:?34). 
In Point II on Page 13 of its prior brief in this 
case, Respondent raised this point that it was discharged 
from the obligation of its bond because of a material 
change in its contract. The point was not even contested 
by Appellant, American Casualty Company and Rom-
ney. No mention on this connection is made by Appel-
lants either in their original brief or in their reply brief. 
There is and can be no dispute about the facts upon 
which this contention of Respondent is based. 
In the original answer of Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent, Industrial Indemnity Company, as 
its third defense (R. 40) Industrial alleged that it was 
relieved of any liability under the bond in question 
herein by reason of the change in identity in the prin-
cipal during the .course Qf constructiqn of the Rehabili-
tation Center without Industrial's knowledge or con-
sent, to its injury. The facts with respect to this con-
tention are not in dispute. 
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At the pre-trial hearing, which was quite extensive 
in this case, the court called upon the various parties 
for various stipulations concerning the facts. The pre-
trial order (R. 225-R. 228) clearly recites the facts. 
Paragraph 3 of the pre-trial order (R. 226) is as fol-
lows: 
"J. G. Wedding did business prior to October 
I, I96I, as Walsh Plumbing Company." 
Paragraph 4 provides: 
"On or about October I, I96I, J. G. Wedding 
sold the Wash Plumbing Company to Sylvia 
Rhode, who immediately thereafter incorporated 
the same as Walsh Plumbing Company, a N e-
vada corporation.'' 
Paragraph 5: 
"Pre-trial Exhibit I is the bond furnished by 
Industrial Indemnity Company, as surety, and 
J. G. Wedding as principal to the G. Maurice 
Romney Company, a partnership." 
Paragraph IO: 
"On or about October I, I96I, the principal 
was changed from J. G. Wedding, doing busi-
ness as Walsh Plumbing Company, to the Walsh 
Plumbing Company, a corporation, but no nova-
tion or agreement between the parties or any of 
them was ever made to the effect that J. G. Wed-
ding was relieved from his contract to perform 
as made with Romney Company." 
The judgment in this case entered April 2, I964, 
from which judgment the court has rp.led the Appella.nt 
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is entitled to appeal, is the judgment before the court 
in this ease, provides at R. 233 and R. 234 as follows: 
"The following facts were stipulated and 
agreed to by the parties : 
1. J. G. Wedding did business prior to October 
I, 1961, as \Valsh Plumbing Company. 
2. On or about October 1, 1961, J. G. Wed-
ding sold the \Valsh Plumbing Company to 
Sylvia Rhode, who immediately thereafter in-
corporated the same as Walsh Plumbing Com-
pany, a Nevada corporation. 
3. Pretrial Exhibit 1 is a bond furnished by 
Industrial Indemnity Company as surety and 
J. G. \Vedding as principal to the G. Maurice 
Romney Company, a partnership. 
5. On or about October 1, 1961, the principal 
was changed from J. G. Wedding, doing busi-
ness as \Valsh Plumbing Company, to the Walsh 
Plumbing Company, a corporation, but no nova-
tion or agreement between the parties or any of 
them was ever made to the effect that J. G. 
\V edding was relieved fro1n his contract to per 
form as made with Romney Company." 
The findings and recitals of this judgment as such 
have never been questioned or challenged by the Appel-
lant and they cannot be because they recite the true 
facts in this case. 
The pretrial order at Paragraph 11, R. 227, and 
especially the affidavit of George R. Romney at R. 
181, show that several months after the sale of the 
business by J. G. Wedding to Sylvia Rhode that there 
7 
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was more than enough money in the Walsh Plumbing 
Company account at Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust 
Company to pay all of the labor and material claims 
involved in this case. Thus it is very clear that the 
surety, Industrial, was prejudiced by the change of 
ownership of the business and the principal on its bond 
in this case because the bank took the money that was 
supposed to pay these labor and material claims on 
some kind of a claim against Sylvia Rhode or Walsh 
Plumbing Company which had nothing to do with J. 
G. Wedding, the original subcontractor and principal 
on the bond. Also, the liabilities for each and all of 
the claims of the claimants in this case were incurred 
after October 1, 1961, to-wit: the date upon which the 
principal on the bond in this case written by Industrial 
Indemnity was changed. Various citations to the record 
showing this with respect to the claimants are, R. 3, 
R. 5, R. 41, R. 61, R. 130, R. 139, R. 151, and R. 160. 
It should also be noted that not only has Appellant 
not challenged the facts and findings in this case with 
respect to the change of principal in this court, but 
never challenged them in the lower court even when 
he could have. For example, Appellant's motion to 
change pretrial order ( R. 229) and its motion to set 
aside the judgment of April 2, 1964, (R. 252), make 
no objection or challenge to the findings of the pre-
trial order or the judgment of April· 2, 1964. Even in 
the findings of the judgment of the part of the case 
which finally went to trial, the court finds at R. 256, 
Paragraph 4, the sa1ne facts disclosed at pretrial and. 
8 
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in the final judgment of .April 2, 1964, upon which 
this appeal is based. 
The authorities seetn to hold without dissent that 
a change of principal is a material change in the obli-
gution which will discharge the surety from liability. 
See Spokane Union Stockyards Com.pany vs. Maryland 
Caaualty Company~ 105 Wash. 306, 178 P. 3, and 50 
Am J ur., Sec. 130, p. 990, 50 Am. J ur., Sec. 50, p. 939, 
and 144 A.L.R. 1267, Note I. 
Respondent submits that the facts and the law 
with respect to this point are clear in this case. It seems 
certain that one or other of the parties herein will be 
right back before this court in the future to determine 
this san1e point upon the basis of this same record. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that its position 
on this point is well taken and that the court should 
consider this contention and sustain the judgment of 
the court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Shirley P. Jones, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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